Thursday, March the 6th, 2008

The fiscal solution to bring about the equilibrium among generations are causing roughs, which cause mental disturbance within each member of the society in turn. Magic words are needed to heal the disunion

Wednesday, March the 5th, 2008

As the Osaka Prefecture is budgeting for the coming fiscal year 2008, the complication among generations is being revealed. The complication is even inside me. Thereby the solution must be even a psychological one, too, as well as a fiscal one.
The combination of the fiscal solution and the psychological solution might bring us a certain equilibium both to the society and the individual. Could, then, an ideology make a psychological solution? If not, a slogan? A catch-copy?

Tuesday, Maarch the 4th, 2008

Loads! Burdens! Will the stressers train me?
The Osaka Prefecture is budgeting for the coming fiscal year 2008. The complication among generations is inside me. Thereby the solution also might be even a psychological one.

Monday, March the 3rd, 2008

A cloudy morning. It is not only clouds that cause the dark weather. Yellow sand is made to fly over from the Gobi. Japanese pollen and Chinese yellow sand are hovering over me.
What is the arbitrariness? When officers are comanding the same kind of power upon all the concerned, can they escape from being called arbitrary? No, not necessarily. In a constitutional sate, the judgement on arbitarariness depends on constitutionalism, not on universality. Even if the power is exercised universally, unless it is exercised under the authority of constitutionalism, unless it depends on a certain text or provision of laws or ordinances, the exercise is arbitrary.

"Critique of Pure Reason"

Immanuel Kant, "Critique of Pure Reason", 2003, Dover Publications, New York

「That all our knowledge begins with experience there can be no doubt.」（p.1）
「But, though all our knowledge begins with experience, it by no means follows that all arises out of experience.」（p.1）
「Experience no doubt teaches us that this or that object is constituted in such and such a manner, but not that it could not possibly exist otherwise.」（p.2）
「It is extremely advantageous to be able to bring a number of investigations under the formula of a single problem. For in this manner, we not only facilitate our own labor, inasmuch as we define it clearly to ourselves, but also render it more easy for others to decide whether we have done justice to our understanding.」（p.12）
「Only so much seems necessary, by way of introduction or premonition, that there are two sources of human knowledge (which probably spring from a common, but to us unknown root), namely, sense and understanding. By the former, objects are given to us; by the latter, thought.」（p.18）
→"there are two sources of human knowledge ..., namely, sense and understanding."
「In whatsoever mode, or by whatsoever means, our knowledge may relate to objects, it is at least quite clear, that the only manner in which it immediately relates to them, is by means of an intuition. ... But an intuition can take place only in so far as the object is given to us.」（p.21）
→Our knowledge is immediately related to objects by means of an intuition, and "an intuition can take place only in so far as the object is given to us." As my understanding relatively depends on the intuition, I have to keep being placed in a field.
「we could only, at best, arrive at a complete cognition of our own mode of intuition, that is, of our sensibility,」（p.36）
→We can hardly cognize an object as it is, as "we could only, at best, arrive at a complete cognition of our own mode of intuition."
「The difference between a confused and a clear representation is merely logical and has nothing to do with content.」（p.36）
「Everything that is represented through the medium of sense is so far phenomenal; consequently, we must either refuse altogether to admit an internal sense, or the subject, which is the object of that sense, could only be represented by it as phenomenon, and not as it would judge of itself, if its intuition were pure spontaneous activity, that is, were intellectual.」（p.40）
「the subject intuits itself, not as it would represent itself immediately and spontaneously, but according to the manner in which the mind is internally affected, consequently, as it appears, and not as it is.」（p.41）
→We cognize ourselves "as it appears, and not as it is."
「Our knowledge springs from two main sources in the mind, the first of which is the faculty or power of receiving representations (receptivity for impressions); the second is the power of cognizing by means of these representations (spontaneity in the production of conceptions). Through the first an object is given to us; through the second, it is, in relation to the representation (which is a mere determination of the mind), thought.」（p.44）
「Thoughts without content are void; intuitions without conceptions, blind. Hence it is as necessary for the mind to make its conceptions sensuous (that is, to join to them the object in intuition), as to make its intuitions intelligible (that is, to bring them under conceptions). Neither of these faculties can exchange its proper function. Understanding cannot intuit, and the sensuous faculty cannot think. In no other way than from the united operation of both, can knowledge arise.」（p.45）
「We therefore distinguish the science of the laws of sensibility, that is, Aesthetic, from the science of the laws of the understanding, that is, Logic.」（p.45）
「Now, logic in its turn may be considered as twofold --- namely, as logic of the general [universal], or of the particular use of the understanding.」（p.45）
→The logic "of the particular use of the understanding" enables us to gain personal knowledge. At this point, Kant has something to do with Michael Polanyi, "Personal Knowledge --- Towards a Post-Critical Philosophy".
「General logic is again either pure or applied.」（p.45）
「General logic, as we have seen, makes abstraction of all content and cognition, that is, of all relation of cognition to its object, and regards only the logical form in the relation of cognitions to each other, that is, the form of thought in general.」（p.47）
「A judgement, therefore, is the mediate cognition of an object, consequently the representation of a representation of it.」（p.55）
「Now thought is cognition by means of conceptions. But conceptions, as predicates of possible judgements, relate to some representation of a yet undetermined object」（p.55）
「General logic, as has been repeatedly said, makes abstraction of all content of cognition, and expects to receive representations from some other quarter, in order, by means of analysis, to convert them into conceptions.」（p.60）
「Synthesis, generally speaking, is, as we shall afterwards see, the mere operation of the imagination --- a blind but indispensable function of the soul, without which we should have no cognition whatever, but of the working of which we are seldom even conscious.」（p.60）
→"Synthesis ... is ... the mere operation of the imagination" whose working "we are seldom even conscious" of.
「The first thing which must be given to us in order to the a priori cognition of all objects, is the diversity of the pure intuition; the synthesis of this diversity by means of the imagination is the second; but this gives, as yet, no cognition.」（p.61）
「since one part cannot be contained in the other, they are cogitated as co-ordinated with, not subordinated to each other, so that they do not determine each other unilaterally, as in a linear series, but reciprocally, as in an aggregate...」（p.65）
→Each individual person is not contained in the other, so people should be co-ordinated with each other, but not subordinated to each other. This leads to the importance of the player's theory.
「that objects of sensuous intuition must correspond to the formal conditions of sensibility existing a priori in the mind, is quite evident, from the fact, that without these they could not be objects for us;」（p.71）
「we do possess scientific a priori cognitions, namely, those of pure mathematics and general physics.」（p.74）
→It is surprising that 2 centuries ago he already reached the ideas like primitive mathematics, primitive physics, and as such.
「the empirical consciousness which accompanies different representations is in itself fragmentary and disunited,」（p.77）
「only because I can connect a variety of given representations in one consciousness, is it possible that I can represent to myself the identity of consciousness in these representations; in other words, the analytycal unity of apperception is possible only under the presupposition of a synthetical unity.」（p.77）
「But the conjunction of representations into a conception is not to be found in objects themselves, nor can it be, as it were, borrowed from them and taken up into the understanding by perception, but it is on the contrary an operation of the understanding itself, which is nothing more than the faculty of conjoining a priori, and of bringing the variety of given representations under the unity of apperception.」（p.78）
→"the conjunction of representations into a conception is not to be found in objects themselves, ... but it is ... an operation of the understanding itself,"
「One person connects the notion conveyed in a word with one thing, another with another thing; and the unity of consciousness in that which is empirical, is, in relation to that which is given by experience, not necessarily and universally valid.」（p.81）
「the categories do not, even by means of pure intuition, afford us any cognition of things; they can only do so in so far as they can be applied to empirical intuition.」（p.85）
→"the categories do not ... afford us any cognition of things; they can only do so in so far as they can be applied to empirical intuition."
→"the categories" can only "afford us any cognition of things ... in so far as they can be applied to empirical intuition."
「If all reality in perception has a degree, between which and negation there is an endless sequence of ever smaller degrees, and if nevertheless every sense must have a determinate degree of receptivity for sensations; no perception, and censequently no experience is possible, which can prove, either immediately or mediately, an entire absence of all reality in a phenomenon; in other words, it is impossible ever to draw from experience a proof of the existence of empty space or of empty time.」（p.120）
→Can we tell the linearity form the nonlinearity?
「experience is possible only by means of a representation of the necessary connection of perception.」（p.122）
→So it is important, in education, to have students connect their perceptions.
「Only the permanent (substance) is subject to change; the mutable suffers no change, but rather alteration,」（p.127）
「Change, then, cannot be perceived by us except in substances,」（p.127）
「When something happens, the mere fact of the occurrence, without regard to that which occurs, is an object requiring investigation.」（p.136）
「But the form of every change, the condition under which alone it can take place as the coming into existence of another state (be the content of the change, that is, the state which is changed, what it may), and consequently the succession of the states themselves, can very well be considered a priori, in relation to the law on causality and the conditions of time.」（p.136）
→The idea that the change "can take place as the coming into existence of another state ... and consequently the succession of the states" is a statical view of things, or the world. The world itself is dynamic. We must see it, or things, in the dynamical way. A statical view is only one conception of the dynamically moving, changing, world.
「the quantity of the reality (b - a) is generated through the lesser degrees which are contained between the first and last. All change is therefore possible only through a continuous action of the causality, which, in so far as it is uniform, we call a momentum. The change does not consist of these momenta, but is generated or produced by them as their effect.」（p.137）
→How many lesser degrees does a change have? Innumerable! Countless! So the change is an infinite series of "the lesser degrees," and continuous.
「It seems, indeed, as if the possibility of a triangle could be cognized from the conception of it alone (which is certainly independent of experience); for we can certainly give to the conception a corresponding object completely a priori, that is to say, we can construct it.」（p.145）
→As Kant put it, "we can construct" (p.145) a transcendental object which corresponds to a concept, it is easy for us to fabricate or forge a reality or a truth.
「Our knowledge of the existence of things reaches as far as our perceptions,」（p.146）
→Well said. We have the limited perception, beyond which nobody can perceive, i.e. cognize, anything.
「the categories are not in themselves cognitions, but mere forms of thought for the construction of cognitions from given intuitions.」（p.153）
→We can construct cognitions from given intuitions with categories. As categories are given by the culture we belong to, we can construct different cognitions from the very same intuitions.
「in order to represent change as the intuition corresponding to the conception of causality, we require the representation of motion as change in space; in fact, it is through it alone that changes, the possibility of which no pure understanding can perceive, are capable of being intuited.」（p.154/155）
→Objects are dynamic; subjective cognition is stative.
「the difference of the internal and external」（p.175）
「Substances, in general, must have something inward, which is therefore free from external relations,」（p.176）
→A man has the internal, " which is ... free from external relations,"(p.176)
「What we cognize in matter is nothing but relations (what we call its internal determinations are but comparatively internal).」（p.182）
→"What we cognize in matter is nothing but relations ...." (p.182)
「The term principle is ambiguous, and commonly signifies merely a cognition that may be employed as a principle; although it is not in itself, and as regards its proper origin, entitled to the distinction.」（p.190）
→"The term principle ... signifies merely a cognition that may be employed as a principle" (p.190) If you employ something as a principle, it will be a principle, and if you don't, it won't.
「From this we see that reason endeavors to subject the great variety of the cognitions of the understanding to the smallest possible number of principles (general conditions), and thus to produce in it the highest unity.」（p.193）
→"reason endeavors to subject the great variety of the cognitions of the understanding to the smallest possible number of principles (general conditions), and thus to produce in it the highest unity." (p.193)
「the whole series of conditions subordinated to one another --- a series which is consequently itself unconditioned ---」（p.194/195）
→If a "whole series of conditions" is "subordinated to one another," the series will be "consequently itself unconditioned." That is to say, a certain process of conditioning can get automated.
「Spite of the great wealth of words which European languages possess, the thinker finds himself often at a loss for an expression exactly suited to his conception, for want of which he is unable to make himself intelligible either to others or to himself. To coin new words is a pretension to legislation in language which is seldom successful; and, before recourse is taken to so desperate an expedient, it is advisable to examine the dead and learned languages, with the hope and the probability that we may there meet with some adequate expression of the notion we have in our minds. In this case, even if the original meaning of the word has become somewhat uncertain, from carelessness or want of caution on the part of the authors of it, it is always better to adhere to and confirm its proper meaning --- even although it may be doubtful whether it was formerly used in exactly this sense --- than to make our labor vain by want of sufficient care to render ourselves intelligible.」（p.197）
「But we should do better to follow up this thought, and, where this admirable thinker leaves us without assistance, employ new efforts to place it in clearer light, rather than carelessly fling it aside as useless, under the very miserable and pernicious pretext of impracticability.」（p.199）
→When we pursue the cooperation with college scholars, we must remember Kant's these words on Plato. Some teachers just turn down the scholars' ideas for their impracticability. But those ideas could be great seeds for tomorrow's teaching skills, and postures or attitudes. The connoisseurship to "place it in clearer light" is what is needed.
「Setting aside the exaggerations of expression in the writings of this philosopher(=Plato), the mental power exhibited in this ascent from the ectypal mode of regarding the physical world to the architectonic connection thereof according to ends, that is, ideas, is an effort which deserves imitation and claims respect.」（p.200）
→We need "the mental power" and efforts to ascent from "the physical world to the architectonic connection thereof."
「confident but vain search for treasures has made in all directions.」（p.201）
→In the history of humanity, "confident but vain search for treasures has made in all directions" by trillions of people, or maybe by trillions of trillions of people.
「Transcendental analytic showed us how the mere logical form of our cognition can contain the origin of pure conceptions a priori, conceptions which represent objects antecedently to all experience, or rather, indicate the synthetical unity which alone renders possible an empirical cognition of objects.」（p.202）
→Kant seems to be talking about biologically built-in universal cognitive power, but can't that be culturally built-in domestic cognitive power?
「Reason, considered as the faculty of certain logical form　of cognition, is the faculty of conclusion, that is, of mediate judgement」（p.207）
→"Reason ... is the faculty of conclusion." (p.207) Without conclusion, the faculty cannot be reason.
「the understanding takes of itself every step downward, from the condition to the conditioned. Thus the transcendental ideas are available only for ascending in the series of conditions, till we reach the unconditioned, that is, principles.」（p.211）
「I cannot obtain the least representation of a thinking being by means of external experience, but solely through self-consciousness. Such objects are consequently nothing more than the transference of this consciousness of mine to other things which can only thus be represented as thinking beings.」（p.216）
→It is clear that we cannot cognize the consciousness of others themselves. We, in stead, build a representation of another conscious being in our cerebrum neural network "by means of external experience," and we cognize the representation in stead of cognizing the being itself. That is the reason we sometimes over-cognize or under-cognize other conscious beings.
「There does not then exist any rational psychology as a doctrine furnishing any addition to our knowledge of ourselves. It is nothing more than a discipline, which sets impassable limits to speculative reason in this region of thought, to prevent it, on the one hand, from throwing itself into the arms of a soulless materialism, and, on the other, from losing itself in the mazes of a baseless spiritualism.」（p.224）
→We should be careful enough "to prevent" ourselves, "on the one hand, from throwing" ourselves "into the arms of a soulless materialism, and, on the other, from losing" ourselves "in the mazes of a baseless spiritualism."
「the reason does not properly give birth to any conception, but only frees the conception of the understanding from the unavoidable limitation of a possible experience, and thus endeavors to raise it above the empirical, though it must still be in connection with it.」（p.232）
→The collaboration with scholars let educational workers free "the conception of the understanding from the unavoidable limitation of a possible experience."
「the series m, n, o, in which n is given as conditioned in relation to m, but at the same time as the condition of o, and let the series proceed upwards from the conditioned n to m (l, k, i, etc.), and also downwards from the condition n to the conditioned o (p, q, r, etc.)」（p.233）
「The brilliant claims of reason striving to extend its domain beyond the limits of experience」（p.262）
「while struggling to rise from the region of experience and to soar to those sublime ideas, philosophy discovers a value and a dignity」（p.263）
→When we do R&D on educational problems, we must strive "to extend its domain beyond the limits of experience" (p.262), and struggle "to rise from the region of experience and to soar to those sublime ideas," so that we can discover "a value and a dignity." (p.263)
「we must rise from a given beginning to one still higher;」（p.265）
「when employed by the empirist, understanding is always upon its proper ground of investigation --- the field of possible experience, the laws of which it can explore, and thus extend its cognition securely and with clear intelligence without being stopped by limits in any direction.」（p.266）
→It reads that I am an empirist. I prefer exploring, and thus extending my "cognition securely and with clear intelligence without being stopped by limits in any direction."
「where all insight and knowledge cease to exist」（p.267）
「if, I say, the empiricist rested satisfied with this benefit, the principle advanced by him would be a maxim recommending moderation in the pretensions of reason and modesty in its affirmations, and at the same time would direct us to the right mode of extending the province of the understanding, by the help of the only true teacher, experience.」（p.267）
→We have to head "to the right mode of extending the province of the understanding, by the help of the only true teacher, experience." (p.267)
「Human reason is by nature architectonic.」（p.269）
「if anyone could free himself entirely from all considerations of interest, and weigh without partiality the assertions of reason, attending only to their content, irrespective of the consequences which follow from them; such a person, on the supposition that he knew no other way out of the confusion than to settle the truth of one or other of the conflicting doctrines, would live in a state of continual hesitation.」（p.269）
→"if anyone could free himself entirely from all considerations of interest, ... such a person ... would live in a state of continual hesitation." (p.269) That is to say, interest is a good guide.
「We should be quite willing to desist from the demand of a dogmatical answer to our questions, if we understand beforehand that, be the answer what it may, it would only serve to increase our ignorance, to throw us from one incomprehensibility into another, from one obscurity into another still greater, and perhaps lead us into irreconcilable contradictions.」（p.275）
→Today many people either have "the demand of a dogmatical answer to our questions", or "live in a state of continual hesitation."
→Today some people, especially those in their young ages, have "the demand of a dogmatical answer to our questions", while some others "live in a state of continual hesitation." Relatively few are
→Today some of us have "the demand of a dogmatical answer to our questions", which serves "to increase our ignorance, to throw us from one incomprehensibility into another, from one obscurity into another still greater, and perhaps lead us into irreconcilable contradictions." Some others still "live in a state of continual hesitation." Relatively few are heading "to the right mode of extending the province of the understanding."
「phenomena are nothing, apart from our representations.」（p.286）
→色即是空、空即是色 All is vanity; vanity is all.
「A primal action --- an action which forms an absolute beginning, is beyond the causal power of phenomena.」（p.305）
→Is it possible for a person to go "beyond the causal power of phenomena"?
「Experience made us acquainted with the contingent.」（p.318）
「The notion of a supreme being is in many respects a highly useful idea; but for the very reason that it is an idea, it is incapable of enlarging our cognition with regard to the existence of things.」（p.337）
「It was by no means a natural course of proceeding, but, on the contrary, an invention entirely due to the subtlety of the schools, to attempt to draw from a mere idea a proof of the existence of an object corresponding to it. Such a course would never have been pursued, were it not for that need of reason which requires it to suppose the existence of a necessary being as a basis for the empirical regress, and that, as this necessity must be unconditioned and a priori, reason is bound to discover a conception which shall satisfy, if possible, this requirement, and enable us to attain to the a priori cognition of such a being.」（p.337）
→Any school has invented its "supreme being" under the need for "the existence of a necessary being as a basis for the empirical regress."
「the world is a sum of phenomena;」（p.390）
「Thus, pure reason, which at first seemed to promise us nothing less than the extension of our cognition beyond the limits of experience, is found, when thoroughly examined, to contain nothing but regulative principles, the virtue and function of which is to introduce into our cognition a higher degree of unity than the understanding could of itself. These principles, by placing the goal of all our struggles at so great a distance, realize for us the most thorough connection between the different parts of our cognition, and the highest degree of systematic unity. But, on the other hand, if misunderstood and employed as constitutive principles of transcendent cognition, they become the parents of illusions and contradictions, while pretending to introduce us to new regions of knowledge.」（p.393）
「Thus all human cognition begins with intuitions, proceeds from thence to conceptions, and ends with ideas.」（p.393）
「Hence the cognition of qualities by reason is possible only through conceptions.」（p.401）
「an empirical conception cannot be defined, it can only be explained.」（p.409）
「philosophy is a cognition of reason by the aid of conceptions alone」（p.411）
「The very existence of reason depends upon this freedom; for the voice of reason is not that of a dictatorial and despotic power, it is rather like the vote of the citizen of a free state, every member of which must have the privilege of giving free expression to his doubts, and possess even the right of veto.」（p.415）
「But it is undoubtedly always beneficial to leave the investigating, as well as the critical reason, in perfect freedom, and permit it to take charge of its own interests, which are advanced as much by its limitation, as by its extension of its views, and which always suffer by the interference of foreign powers forcing it, against its natural tendencies, to bend to certain preconceived designs.」（p.418）
「There is in human nature an unworthy propensity --- a propensity which, like everything that springs from nature, must in its final purpose be conducive to the good of humanity --- to conceal our real sentiments, and to give expression only to certain received opinions, which are regarded as at once safe and promotive of the common good. It is true, this tendency, not only to conceal our real sentiments, but to profess those which may gain us favor in the eyes of society, has not only civilized, but, in a certain measure, moralized us; as no one can break through the outward covering of respectability, honor, and morality, and thus the seemingly good examples which we see around us, form an excellent school for moral improvement, so long as our belief in their genuineness remains unshaken. But this disposition to represent ourselves as better than we are, and to utter opinions which are not our own, can be nothing more than a kind of provisionary argument of nature to lead us from the rudeness of an uncivilized state, and to teach us how to assume at least the appearance and manner of the good we see. But when true principles have been developed, and have obtained a sure foundation in our habit of thought, this conventionalism must be attacked with earnest vigor, otherwise it corrupts the heart, and checks the growth of good dispositions with the mischievous weed of fair appearances.」（p.420）
「This freedom will, among other things, permit of our openly stating the difficulties and doubts which we are ourselves unable to solve, without being decried on that account as turbulent and dangerous citizens.」（p.422）
「It is unwise, moreover, to denounce as dangerous, any bold assertions against, or rash attacks upon, an opinion which is held by the largest and most moral class of the community; for that would be giving them an importance which they do not deserve.」（p.422）
「All ignorance is either ignorance of things, or of the limits of knowledge.」（p.425）
「the empirical and ever-shifting bounds of our knowledge」（p.427）
「The first step in regard to the subjects of pure reason, and which marks the infancy of that faculty, is that of dogmatism. The second, which we have just mentioned, is that of scepticism, and it gives evidence that our judgement has been improved by experience.」（p.427）
「scepticism is a resting-place for reason ...; but it cannot be its permanent dwelling-place.」（p.427）
→It seems that some people prefer keeping "dwelling" in "a resting-place."
「We are actually in possession of a priori synthetical cognitions, as is proved by the existence of the principles of the understanding, which anticipate experience.」（p.428）
→That is to say, we have a biologically-installed synthetical cognitions.
「one naturally arms one's self to resist an attack, and becomes more obstinate in the resolve to establish the claims he has advanced.」（p.431）
→We are academically stubborn.
「we cannot assume that there is any other kind of community among substances than that observable in experience」（p.433）
「The difficulties and objections we have to fear lie in ourselves.」（p.436/437）
「External tranquillity is hollow and unreal.」（p.437）
「It is our duty, therefore, to try to discover new objections, to put weapons in the hands of our opponent, and to grant him the most favorable position in the arena that he can wish. We have nothing to fear from these concessions; on the contrary, we may rather hope that we shall thus make ourselves master of a possession which no one will never venture to dispute.」（p.437）
→Does that mean I have to face another self in myself, to be a master of myself? Do I have to raise and nourish another self in myself to make a master of myself?
「How else can we account for the inextinguishable desire in the human mind to find a firm footing in some region beyond the limits of the world of experience?」（p.447）
→We need the help of scholars to "account for the inextinguishable desire in the human mind to find a firm footing in some region beyond the limits of the world of experience". (p.447)
「There exists in the faculty of reason a natural desire to venture beyond the field of experience, to attempt to reach the utmost bounds of all cognition by the help of ideas alone, and not to rest satisfied, until it has fulfilled its course and raised the sum of its cognitions into a self-subsistent systematic whole. Is the motive for this endeavor to be found in its speculative, or in its practical interests alone?」（p.445）
→I think I have "a natural desire to venture beyond the field of experience," but wonder if all the other teachers, except some few, have one.
「The whole interest of reason, speculative as well as practical, is centered in the three following questions:
1. What can I know?
2. What ought I to do?
3. What may I hope?」（p.451）
「Happiness is the satisfaction of all our desires; extensive in regard to their multiplicity; intensive, in regard to their degree; and protensive, in regard to their duration.」（p.452）
「without a God and without a world, invisible to us now, but hoped for, the glorious ideas of morality are, indeed, objects of approbation and of admiration, but cannot be the springs of purpose and action.」（p.456）
→"(W)ithout a God and without a world, ... the glorious ideas of morality are, indeed, objects of approbation and of admiration, but cannot be the springs of purpose and action." (p.456) I may put it this way: without something, "the glorious ideas of morality are, indeed, objects of approbation and of admiration, but cannot be the springs of purpose and action." Then what is the "something", which connects "the glorious ideas of morality" and "purpose and action"?
「we must come to the conclusion that there is one only supreme will, which comprehends all these laws in itself. ... This will must be omnipotent, that all nature and its relation to morality in the world may be subject to it; omniscient, that it may have knowledge of the most secret feelings and their moral worth; omnipresent, that it may be at hand to supply every necessity to which the highest weal of the world may give rise; eternal, that this harmony of nature and liberty may never fail; and so on.」（p.457）
「we shall look upon ourselves as acting in conformity with the divine will only in so far as we hold sacred the moral law which reason teaches us from the nature of actions themselves, and we shall believe that we can obey that will only by promoting the weal of the universe in ourselves and in others.」（p.459）
「The holding of a thing to be true, is a phenomenon in our understanding which may rest on objective grounds, but requires, also, subjective causes in the mind of the person judging. If a judgement is valid for every rational being, then its ground is objectively sufficient, and it is termed a conviction. If, on the other hand, it has its ground in the particular character of the subject, it is termed a persuasion.」（p.460）
「Persuasion is a mere illusion, the ground of the judgement, which lies solely in the subject, being regarded as objective. Hence a judgement of this kind has only private validity --- is only valid for the individual who judges, and the holding of a thing to be true in this way cannot be communicated. But truth depends upon agreement with the object, and consequently the judgements of all understandings, if true, must be in agreement with each other (consentientia uni tertio consentiunt inter se). Conviction may, therefore, be distinguished, from an external point of view, from persuasion, by the possibility of communicating it, and by showing its validity for the reason of every man;」（p.460）
→Now it becomes clear why we can hardly communicate each other today. As our judgement "has its ground in the particular character of the subject," (p.460) the judgement "cannot be communicated." (ibid.)
「Opinion is a consciously insufficient judgement, subjectively as well as objectively. Belief is subjectively sufficient, but is recognized as being objectively insufficient. Knowledge is both subjectively and objectively sufficient.」（p.461）
「mathematics alone can be learned. Philosophy --- unless it be in an historical manner --- cannot be learned; we can at most learn to philosophize.」（p.470）
→"Philosophy ... cannot be learned; we can at most learn to philosophize." (p.470)
「it must be admitted that even thinkers by profession have been unable clearly to explain the distinction between the two elements of our cognition --- the one completely a priori, the other a posteriori.」（p.472/473）
→"(T)he distinction between the two elements of our cognition --- the one completely a priori, the other a posteriori" (p.473) could be the distinction between the two biases of our cognition: the one biological, the other cultural.

Sunday, March the 2nd, 2008

Now it becomes clear why we can hardly communicate each other today. As our judgement "has its ground in the particular character of the subject," (p.460, Immanuel Kant, "Critique of Pure Reason", 2003, Dover Publications, New York) the judgement "cannot be communicated." (ibid.)
I have read through "Critique of Pure Reason." I started reading it because I felt some similarity between today's cognitive science and Kant's philosophy. At the beginning, I was moved to see Kan's far-seeing intelligence. He almost predicted the achievement of today's cognitive science without any assistance of scientific experiments. As I kept reading, however, I started wondering if it was Kant's prophecy that preceeded today's science, or if it is today's scientists who have just followed his frameworks.

Saturday, March the 1st, 2008

The first day of the month. It means we have had another month passed. 17 days before my younger daughter has her entrance examination. 12 months before my elder daughter has her entrance examination. 10 years before my retirement. How many years before my death?
"(W)ithout a God and without a world, ... the glorious ideas of morality are, indeed, objects of approbation and of admiration, but cannot be the springs of purpose and action." (p.456, Immanuel Kant, "Critique of Pure Reason", 2003, Dover Publications, New York) I may put it this way: without something,"the glorious ideas of morality are, indeed, objects of approbation and of admiration, but cannot be the springs of purpose and action." Then what is the "something", which connects "the glorious ideas of morality" and "purpose and action"?

Friday, February the 29th, 2008

The last day of the month; the beginning of another pollen season.
A proposal in writing might be a better form for the paper on the collaboration with research institutes outside the school. Will the form be accepted?